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1 Introduction
Computer viruses are an omnipresent issue of information technology, a lot of
books discusse thier practical issues, see [6] or [9]. But, as far as we know,
there are only a few theoretical studies on this topic. This situation is amazing
because the term “computer virus” comes from the seminal theoretical works of
Cohen [2–4] and Adleman [1] in the mid-1980’s. We do think that theoretical
point of view on computer viruses may bring some new insights to the area,
as it is also advocated for example by Filiol [5], an expert on computer viruses
and cryptology, or Zuo and Zhou [10]. Indeed, a deep comprehension of viral
mechanisms is from our point of view a promising way to suggest new directions
on virus detection and defense.
This being said, the first question is what is a virus? We try to give an answer
in sect. 2. Then, sect. 3 studies detection strategies widely used by antiviruses.
The proofs of the theorems and some illustration are given in appendix.
2 Abstract Virology
We briefly introduce our formal framework for virus modeling. We are consider-
ing an acceptable enumeration of recursive functions ϕ
First, to build a computer virus, you have to find vulnerability for infection
spreading, typically an exploit that allows remote execution. Then, you have to
write a self-reproducing program using this vulnerability. Moreover, you could
add a payload or furtiveness modules.
To follow this scheme, we describe the propagation mechanism by a com-
putable function B. B(r,p) is the program that spreads the program r over the
program structure p. An example is provided in A.1.
Then, a virus w.r.t. the propagation mechanism B is a program v which
propagate itself. It follows the definition.
Definition 1 (Virus). Assume that B is a semi-computable function. A virus
w.r.t. B is a program v s.t. for each p and x in D, ϕv(p, x) = ϕB(r,p)(x).
B is the propagation function of the virus v, and B(v,p) is called the infected
form of p w.r.t. v and B. A construction is provided in A.2.
More formally, to build a virus, we consider a propagation mechanism and
through iteration theorem we specialize it in B(v,p) e.g. the program that
spreads v over p. Then, to add self-reproduction, we use the recursion theorem
to build v, the program that spreads itself. In fact, this is a generic construction.
An illustration is provided in sect. A.3.
Theorem 2 (Generic Virus). If f is a semi-computable function, then there
is a virus v s.t. ϕv(p, x) = f(v,p, x).
3 Detection Strategies
Virus Detection. A method widely used for virus detection is file scanning. It
uses signatures that only match the considered viruses and not healthy programs.
To thwart this detection a polymorphic virus changes some parts of its code
to look different on duplication. Clearly, it used the fact that for all semi-
computable function f there are infinitely many programs that compute f –
see padding lemma [7]. A formal approach is given in sect. B.1.
As a result, to detect all polymorphic forms, one has to decide the set of
viruses VB = {v | ∀p, x : ϕB(v,p)(x) = ϕv(p, x)}. Unfortunately the following
holds.
Theorem 3. There are some functions B for which VB is Π2-complete.
But there is some hope, the following theorem is, as far as we know, one of
the first positive results concerning the detection.
Theorem 4. There are some functions B for which VB is decidable.
The propagation function is strongly linked to iteration function. Thus, it could
possible to investigate partial evaluation based on evaluators associated with
decidable sets of viruses. This could lead to an execution environment where all
virus will be detectable.
Infected Programs Detection. When a new computer virus is identified, antivirus
editors broadcast updates in order to detect all new infected programs. This
strategy correspond to decide, the infection set Iv = {B(v,p) | p ∈ D}. But this
is not effective. For some viruses, you cannot decide infected programs.
Theorem 5. There is a virus v s.t. Iv is Σ1-complete.
Behavior Detection. Some antiviruses use viral behavior detection, trying to
isolate a set which includes all infected programs and no “sane” program.
The set of all programs that behave as an infected program is called the
germ Gv = {q | ∃p : ϕq ≈ ϕB(v,p)}. As Gv is an extensional set, Rice theorem
reminds us that it can’t be decided. However, there is a clever detection strategy
associated with this set.
A virus v is said isolable within its germ if there is a decidable set R s.t.
Iv ⊂ R ⊂ Gv. Programs of the germ behave as infected programs, thus they
produce infected forms, so they are detected by deciding R. Moreover, R contains
only programs behaving as infected forms, e.g. no sane program is detected.
Unfortunately, the following theorem, conjectured by Adleman in [1], holds.
Theorem 6. There is a virus v which is not isolable within its germ.
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A Abstract Virology
A.1 Propagation Function
With p = (p1, ...,pn) a sequence of programs and x · y the concatenation of x
and y, the following function ∆, spread r over p.
∆(r,p) = (p1 · r, ...,pn · r) .
As ∆ is computable, there is a program e s.t. ϕe(r,p, x) = ∆(r,p).
Now we define B(r,p) = S(e, r,p), it follows
ϕB(r,p)(x) = ϕS(e,r,p)(x) by definition of B
= ϕe(r,p, x) by iteration theorem
ϕB(r,p)(x) = (p1 · r, ...,pn · r) by definition of e .
The program B(r,p) spreads r over p using the mechanism described by ∆.
Throughout, B(r,p) = S(e, r,p) is the specialization of propagation program e
for the propagated code r and the program structure p.
In other words, one can see B as a vulnerability of the programming environ-
ment. Indeed, B is a functional property of the programming language ϕ which
is used by a virus to propagate itself into the system. From biological view, B is
the vector which carries and transmits the virus.
The ∆ propagation could be illustrated with the following bash code.
for FName in $ ( l s $2 ) ;do
i f [ . /$FName != $1 ] ; then
cat $1 >> . /$FName
f i
done
This program concatenates its first argument at the end of every file in the path
given as the second argument.
A.2 Virus
Continuing example provided in A.1 and considering ϕB(r,p)(x) as a function f
of r, p and x, the recursion theorem provide a program v s.t.
ϕv(p, x) = f(v,p, x) = ϕB(v,p)(x) .
By definition, v is a virus w.r.t. to B. Effectively, v is a program which propagate
its own code.
ϕv(p, x) = ϕB(v,p)(x) = (p1 · v, ...,pn · v) .
The execution of v adds v at the end of every program of the structure given
as its first entry. This could be illustrated programmatically with the following
bash code.
for FName in $ ( l s $1 ) ;do
i f [ . /$FName != $0 ] ; then
cat $0 >> . /$FName
f i
done
Notice this bash code is obtained by digitalization of sect. A.1’s example.
Many real computer viruses use this kind of propagation. Jerusalem, the plaid
of 1988, behaves the same way, it adds itself to executable file – that is, .COM or
.EXE files.
A.3 Generic Virus
Theorem 7 (Generic Virus). If f is a semi-computable function, then there
is a virus v s.t. ϕv(p, x) = f(v,p, x).
Proof. Recursion theorem implies that the semi-computable function f has a
fixed point that we call v. We have ϕv(p, x) = f(v,p, x).
Next, let e be a program computing f , that is f ≈ ϕe. The propagation
function B induced by v is defined by B(v,p) = S(e,v,p), since
ϕB(v,p)(x) = ϕS(e,v,p)(x) by definition of B
= ϕe(v,p, x) by iteration theorem
= f(v,p, x) by definition of e
ϕB(v,p)(x) = ϕv(p, x) by definition of v ,
v fulfills the theorem.
Again, it is worth to say that the propagation function relies on the iteration
function S. In some sense, S should be considered as a vulnerability, which is
inherent to each acceptable programming language.
This theorem allows adding functionalities freely to a computer virus. To
illustrate this, we construct a virus which performs several actions depending
on some conditions. This construction of triggers is very general and embeds a
lot of practical cases. Typically, some conditions could trigger a payload, like a
logic bomb.
Corollary 8. Let C1, . . . , Ck be k semi-computable disjoint subsets of D and
V1, . . . , Vk be k semi-computable functions. There is a virus v which satisfies for
all p and x, the equation
ϕv(p, x) =

V1(v,p, x) (p, x) ∈ C1
...
Vk(v,p, x) (p, x) ∈ Ck
.
Proof. Define
f(y,p, x) =

V1(y,p, x) (p, x) ∈ C1
...
Vk(y,p, x) (p, x) ∈ Ck
.
As f is semi-computable the theorem 2 provide the desired virus v.
B Detection Strategies
B.1 Virus Detection
Theorem 9 (Polymorphism Generator). If f is a semi-computable func-
tion, then there is a computable function G s.t.
∀i ∈ D : G(i) is a virus (1)
∀i, j ∈ D : i 6= j ⇒ G(i) 6= G(j) (2)
∀i, x,p ∈ D : ϕG(i)(p, x) = f(G(i),p, x) . (3)
Proof. In fact, G is fixed point generator. Let f a semi-computable function, e a
program computing f , we define the computable function f1 by f1(y) = S(e, y).
The parameterized recursion theorem [8] provides a computable function G
s.t.
∀i ∈ D : ϕG(i) ≈ ϕf1(G(i)) (X)
∀i, j ∈ D : i 6= j ⇒ G(i) 6= G(j) . (3)
It follows, for all i,
ϕG(i)(p, x) = ϕf1(G(i))(p, x) by (X)
ϕG(i)(p, x) = f(G(i),p, x) by definition of f1 .
This provides the property (2). Moreover, for all i, G(i) is a virus w.r.t. B(v,p) =
S(e,v,p), we have the property (1). We conclude that G fulfills the theorem.
Theorem 10. There are some functions B for which VB is Π2-complete.
Proof. Suppose now given a computable function t computed by q. It is well
known that the set T = {i | ϕi = t} is Π2-complete. Define now B(y, p) =
S(q, p) and observe that a virus v verify ∀p, x : ϕv(p, x) = t(p, x). The pairing
procedure being surjective, v is an index of t.
Conversely, suppose that e is not a virus. In that case, there is some p, x for
which ϕe(p, x) 6= ϕB(e,p)(x) = t(p, x). As a consequence, it is not an index of t.
So, VB = T .
Theorem 11. There are some functions B for which VB is decidable.
Proof. Let us define f(y,p, x) = ϕy(p, x) computed by e. Iteration theorem
provides S(e, y,p) s.t. for all y,p, x, ϕS(e,y,p)(x) = f(y,p, x). Let us define
B(y,p) = S(e, y,p). In that case, any program is a virus.
B.2 Infected Programs Detection
Theorem 12. There is a virus v s.t. Iv is Σ1-complete.
Proof. Let K a Σ1-complete set, there is a computable function s.t. f(D) = K.
Let B(v,p) = f(p) and consider v s.t. ϕv(p, x) = ϕf(p)(x). v is a virus w.r.t.
B and the associated infection set Iv = f(D) is Σ1-complete.
B.3 Behavior Detection
Theorem 13. There is a virus v which is not isolable within its germ.
Proof. Consider the virus of theorem 5’s proof with K = {p | ϕp(p) ↓}.
Suppose that v is isolable within its germ, there exists R decidable s.t. Iv ⊂
R ⊂ Gv. Let Rc the complementary of R and r the program s.t. ϕr is the
characteristic function of Rc, thus ϕr(x) ↓⇔ x ∈ Rc (X).
Notice that K ⊂ R, thus K and Rc are disjoint.
– Suppose that ϕr(r) ↓, so r ∈ K. By definition of r, ϕr(r) ↓⇔ r ∈ Rc. As a
result r ∈ K and r ∈ Rc, which is absurd.
– Suppose that ϕr(r) ↑, so r 6∈ Rc and r ∈ R. By hypothesis R ⊂ Gv, thus
r ∈ Gv. By definition of Gv there exists p s.t. ϕB(v,p) ≈ ϕr (z) and by
definition of B, B(v,p) ∈ K, as a result ϕB(v,p)(B(v,p)) ↓. (z) provides
ϕB(v,p)(B(v,p)) = ϕr(B(v,p)) ↓ and (X) gives B(v,p) ∈ Rc. Moreover
B(v,p) ∈ K, which is absurd because K and Rc are disjoint.
v is not isolable within its germ.
